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When a rule becomes inundated by exceptions, it’s useful to examine its significance within 
the context of cases to which it applies. We might expect that certain rules would cause more 
controversy than others based on their relative complexity; however, even the most 
seemingly straightforward rules raise questions about the point at which exceptions can and 
should occur. When I was in grade school, everyone was expected to adhere by a strict dress 
code, which was explicitly laid out in the school’s handbook. All students were required to 
wear coat and tie (it was an all boys school) unless told otherwise by a teacher. Problems 
arose, though, on the warmer fall and spring days when students felt uncomfortable having to 
wear their sport coats at all times. As such, an exception to the rule was made on days during 
which it was determined by the headmaster to be too warm for sport coats. Although this 
example seems trivial, it points to complex issues about the point at which an exception 
should be granted, and under what specific circumstances. Not only do students have 
different levels of tolerance for warm temperatures, but they also wear different kinds of 
sport coats, shirts, and pants, meaning that they could certainly disagree over the appropriate 
or applicable “norm” to apply. Given that the traditions of the school were old and well 
respected, there were many faculty members who felt as though the exception need only be 
granted in the most extreme cases.  
A case this minor provides some sense of how many factors need to be considered in 
determining what norms and exceptions are, and how to assess the viability of any criteria for 
assessing the applicability of a given exception. It’s not suprising, therefore, that debates 
about the single most important document in the US’s history, the Constitution, have spanned 
several centuries. In particular, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, which 
declares that “Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press,” has resulted in countless landmark Supreme Court decisions that have gradually 
altered the standards for what constitutes protected speech in America. Its significance should 
not be understated, as it affects virtually every form of media production consumed within 
the United States. Despite the fact that the statement itself appears definitive and absolute, 
since it clearly states that “no law” should be made, the command itself possesses the 
potential to create controversy. Thus, numerous situations have occurred in the past where the 
resultant controversy has brought about perceived danger or harm to others.  
Beginning with the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, which made it a crime to write 
anything false or scandalous against the government, there was a growing willingness 
amongst members of the Supreme Court to sacrifice the literal meaning of the First 
Amendment to a more interpretive reading. The journey of free speech policy in the United 
States has taken and continues to take a number of complex turns because interpretations 
evolve or shift over time, and with recent advancements in Internet communication, the First 
Amendment seems poised to remain a major focal point in the realm of free speech. 
David M. O’Brien’s Congress Shall Make No Law: The First Amendment, 
Unprotected Expression, and the Supreme Court serves as a significant contribution to the 
field of First Amendment Law by offering an overview of crucial issues and, moreover, by 
emphasizing the outlook for the future of free speech. O’Brien’s credentials position him 
favorably for the task; he was a judicial fellow and research associate with the Supreme 
Court, he has written numerous articles and books on the Supreme Court, and he is currently 
the Leone Reaves and George W. Spicer Professor of Law at the University of Virginia. 
Considering the daunting task of compiling a succinct account and analysis of the history of 
free speech in the United States, Professor O’Brien does well to allow readers to better 
understand the complexities of free speech policy in the United States. 
O’Brien’s introductory chapter begins with a discussion about some of the primary 
differences in specific First Amendment interpretation methods. While recognizing the early 
relevance of Ad Hoc Balancing and First Amendment Absolutism, O’Brien shifts his focus 
toward the method that the Supreme Court gradually came to accept, known as Definitional 
Balancing. This technique, defined by the Supreme Court’s grouping of unprotected speech 
into certain definitional categories, serves as the foundation and organizational structure of 
the book, allowing the reader to closely align his or her thinking with that of the Supreme 
Court by focusing one at a time on specific areas of controversy. The four categories of 
unprotected speech, -- the obscene, the defamatory, commercial, and fighting words or 
disruptive expression, -- serve as the subjects of the middle chapters, in which O’Brien 
examines the respective landmark Supreme Court rulings that apply to each and the issues at 
stake. 
One of the valuable aspects of O’Brien’s analysis is that he traces each category from 
its beginning up until the present, while ultimately making claims about how the Supreme 
Court now rules upon that category. When commenting upon obscenity, O’Brien points out 
that one of the only kinds of speech that now qualifies as obscene is child pornography. He 
notes that, “While the court has largely expanded First Amendment protection for obscenity 
by narrowing that category of unprotected speech to basically hard-core pornography, child 
pornography has been recognized as a special case because of the harmful effects on children 
in its production, possession, and distribution.” Therefore, as O’Brien comments, there is a 
definite limiting factor that occurs over time as a result of definitional balancing. Likewise, 
the category of so-called “fighting words” has been rendered almost completely null. This 
suggests that over time definitional balancing can in fact reach a threshold at which there 
remains little room for change. 
In the conclusion, O’Brien points out that the various categories now provide at best a 
guiding framework for the Supreme Court. There now exist a number of other content-based 
restrictions on free speech due to specific circumstances, which only complicates the 
technique of definitional balancing. The fact that O’Brien has structured his book around 
these categories, but is at the same time arguing against their future significance, suggests 
that he believes free speech policy will inevitably undergo changes. He hints at the 
importance of advancing technology, which makes a great deal of sense sense considering the 
role of technology in previous cases: “As technology advances and new Frist Amendment 
challenges arise, the Court may well find new categories of constitutionally unprotected 
expression or further content-based exceptions to its categorical approach to freedom of 
expression.” Although it can be bold to try to predict the developmental strategies of the 
Supreme Court, O’Brien’s ideas possess sound backing and thought with regards to where he 
sees the direction of Free Speech policy heading in the near future. 
Throughout the book, O’Brien focuses his discussion and analysis of these categories 
of unprotected expression around the issues and questions regarding why freedom of 
expression matters. The question of the relevance of freedom of expression and its restriction 
acts as a guiding principle, providing the discussion and analysis of Supreme Court decisions 
with a practical undertone that comes in welcome contrast to the often technical and 
rebarbative nature of actual court cases. In so doing, O’Brien indirectly makes the point that 
freedom of speech policy affects everyone’s lives, and discussions thereof should be 
accessible to readers beyond legal scholars. 
The manner in which O’Brien reconnects his central focus question to his concluding 
argument ultimately strengthens his final analysis. When speaking about potential future 
Supreme Court philosophy, O’Brien recommends that the Supreme Court will and should 
continue to confront the question of why society values freedom of expression. He asks, 
“Why do we, as citizens no less than Congress and the Court, value freedom of expression?” 
By placing this question at the forefront, it will allow definitional balancing to garner less 
weight, which it has already begun to do. The concluding argument proposes a number of the 
same questions from the introduction, granting his analysis another level of continuity and 
purpose. Aside from the past techniques of the Supreme Court, these questions about the 
relevance and value of freedom of expression are most useful when thinking about the future. 
Overall, O’Brien’s book deserves praise and is an excellent read for anyone looking 
for a succinct account and analysis of the history of the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment. The author succeeds most by providing a historical account and building his 
arguments to convey practicality and resonance for future generations. His passion for the 
subject is apparent, causing the reader to further understand the severity of the issues at stake 
within the this topic. There is no doubt that the restriction of free speech in the United States 
affects nearly every form of media that is consumed and every public action that occurs. 
When thinking about the book in relation to the idea of exceptions, O’Brien’s 
argument suggests that there are periods during which the number of exceptions increases, 
while there are also periods during which the number of exceptions decreases. Thus, it is 
crucial for the Supreme Court to be reevaluating its methods in order to determine the degree 
to which exceptions should be permitted based on the current climate. Even though past 
decisions bear tremendous weight upon the Supreme Court, it is more beneficial to consider 
the relevant circumstances and questions at work within the specific case.  
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